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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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provided the Western governments did not seek "complications."

During this period the Kremlin can try to exploit divergent Western estimates of the importance of maintaining a position in West Berlin by force and of continuing to refuse recognition to East Germany, and continue its war of nerves against West Berlin citizens.

#### Allied Military Position

The Allied garrison in West Berlin consists of only 6,626 combat troops and some 2,500 service personnel; there are also some 14,000 West German police there. In East Berlin, on the other hand--apart from Soviet personnel attached to the Kommandatura at Karlshorst--there is an East German force of some 18,000 security police of various types, backed by a 10,000-man workers' militia. Within ten miles of the city there are some 30,000 Soviet and 16,000 East German soldiers, as well as 6,450 security police.

Allied military forces in West Berlin are almost completely dependent on external sources of supply. Their line of communications extends across East German territory and is subject to Communist interference at any time.

Moscow has already made certain moves toward turning over access control to East German authorities and appears to have actually transferred

its function of dealing with Allied personnel in East Berlin. It is also preparing to move its Berlin Kommandatura from Karlshorst to some nearby point outside the city. East German personnel have appeared alongside Soviet officials checking Allied documentation at the railroad and highway checkpoints and others are reportedly being trained to take over access



control duties. When controls are turned over, the East Germans may be phased into their new duties in order to test Western determination at each stage of the transfer.

Interference with Allied surface and air access need not be overt. Railroad access is particularly vulnerable, since all rail facilities are East German and all locomotives and train crews of Allied military

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# PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

## COMMUNIST TACTICS AGAINST WEST BERLIN


The vulnerabilities inherent in West Berlin's isolated position and dependence on Western aid and protection will be exploited by the Communists in their long-term campaign designed to weaken Western determination to maintain Allied rights in West Berlin, force the West to deal with East Germany, exclude Western influences from the city, and undercut its political and economic strength. The Communists hope to undermine the will of the population to resist and thus bring West Berlin under complete Communist control, either as a "free city" or in some other manner.

### Character of Communist Threat

Berlin is a trump card in Moscow's strategy to gain recognition for East Germany. In its

note of 27 November 1958 to the Western Allies, the Kremlin asserted that "the most correct and natural solution" to the Berlin problem would be to unify the city and incorporate it into East Germany. As a "concession," however, the Soviet Union offered to underwrite the creation of a demilitarized "free city" of West Berlin from which all Western "subversive" activities would be eliminated.

Moscow asserted its intention of turning over to the East Germans those remaining occupation functions it now exercises, if its proposals should be unacceptable to the Western powers. The USSR added, however, that no changes would be made in present controls over Allied military transport for six months



a long-sought objective. Such a step would seriously interfere with the use of West Berlin as an asylum for East Germans. More than half of all refugees from East Germany make their escape through Berlin. The percentage rose to 64 percent during June, July, and August 1958.

#### Harassment of West Berlin

Current Soviet tactics in the war of nerves against West Berlin have emphasized a "soft" approach, advertising the prospect of closer and "more natural" economic relations with East Germany. The USSR and East Germany have declared they are ready to place orders for industrial goods with the city's enterprises and undertake deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs. These orders would be designed to lay the groundwork for West Berlin's eventual economic assimilation.

The Communists could stop the shipment of East German goods to West Berlin, although this measure alone would have only a limited effect.

In connection with the West Berlin election of 7 December, in which the Communists received less than 2 percent of the vote, East Germans threatened certain West Berliners with reprisals if they did not support the Socialist Unity (Communist) party's electoral campaign. German employees of Allied missions were warned they would be blacklisted or worse if East Germany took over the whole city.

The East Germans have already taken steps to separate their transport system from West Berlin's and to eliminate their remaining dependence on transportation facilities in the Western sectors. The Communist ability to harass trans-

Berlin will increase as improvements are made in the railroad and canal bypass rings.

Measures to isolate West Berlin from the transport nets, although they would entail adverse economic consequences for East Germany, would be designed to limit travel from East Germany to the Western sectors, thereby sharply restricting the flight of refugees, and making it more difficult for the weary East Germans to view the West's "show window." East German authorities have already instituted measures to bar access and, if internal tensions increase, further controls are likely to be imposed. Restrictions are being put into effect to halt East German attendance at the "Green Week" agricultural fair in West Berlin, which in the past has been attended by more than 100,000 of Ulbricht's subjects.

It would be extremely difficult for the East Germans to seal off the Western sectors completely. The border passes through streets, squares, woodlands, fields, and lakes, and along canals. There are also several Western enclaves in East Zone territory. The East German police, border guards, and workers' militiamen could be posted at strategic points, but it would be impossible to seal the dividing line effectively. Instead, the Communists are likely to continue their tactics of intimidation, infiltration, and harassment.

#### Western Retaliation

The West has limited capability, short of force, to prevent continued Communist encroachments. There are no longer opportunities to retaliate against East German traffic passing through West Berlin. West Berlin must count on the Federal Republic for support,

trains are supplied by the Ulbricht regime. There are many means of harassment, some outwardly minuscule but nonetheless effective, that could interfere with access but which would not lend themselves to effective Western retaliation or protest.

East Germany has already challenged the Allied right to use the air corridors and is likely to reiterate its demands for control. Without resorting to direct use of force, the Communists could make Allied flights to Berlin a hazardous proposition by means of electronic interference or by crowding the air corridors with planes.

#### Harassment of Civilian Supply

West German traffic has been highly vulnerable to harassment, and Bonn has heretofore been reluctant to resort to reprisals. West Berlin is almost entirely dependent on Western sources of supply for its population of 2,200,000 and for its booming industry. In 1957 approximately 39 percent of freight from the West to the city, including 65 percent of its foodstuffs, was carried by truck, mainly on the Helmstedt autobahn; 61 percent of outgoing freight went by truck. Railroads carried approximately 34 percent of incoming shipments and hauled out some 15 percent, while canal barges accounted for a corresponding 26 and 23 percent. Only a small proportion of West Berlin's supplies come from East Germany, notably brown-coal briquettes for heating, some construction materials, and certain perishable foodstuffs.

Civilian travelers and freight move along the autobahn and three other designated highways. The Berlin-Helmstedt railroad line carries the greatest number of passengers and the

bulk of the freight transported by rail. Barges move through the Mittelland Canal and Havel River system or via the Elbe-Havel route.

Civilian traffic, other than by air, is completely under East German control. West German nationals en route to or from Berlin must present passports or identity cards but have not yet been required to obtain visas. West Berliners show their identity cards.

Civilian traffic could be subjected to a large variety of harassments, including physical interference, delays, taxation, or requirements for more documents. Generally, there would be nothing the West could do to prevent these harassments or to retaliate in an effective way. West German economic sanctions could be used but would not be sufficient to stop a determined Communist initiative.

#### Civilian Air Access

Three Western civil airlines (Pan American, British European Airways, and Air France) use the air corridors under safety guarantees from the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), with West Berlin's Tempelhof airport serving as the terminal. East Germany has already claimed that such aircraft have no right to fly through the corridors without its permission and have charged that they often carry illegal goods. If the Kremlin removes its representatives from the BASC, these airlines would have to operate without air safety guarantees or deal directly with the East Germans, which would mean further demands such as the right to inspect manifests.

East German interference with civilian flights to West Berlin would be designed, among other objectives, to put an end to the transportation of refugees,

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reluctant to take steps necessary to deter Communist harassment. Apart from cutting off steel and coke shipments, these steps could include severing East German shipments through Hamburg--a step which would arouse vigorous resistance from West German business circles.

American officials in Berlin report a "steadfast" public confidence in the Western powers, particularly the United States. Recalling their 1948 experiences, Berliners feel that a firm Western reaction will be sufficient to cause Moscow to reconsider any blockade plans.

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Some indications of nervousness have been revealed in West Berlin business circles, and there has been some movement of valuables and belongings out of West Berlin.

As this uncertainty concerning the future continues, the economic situation in West Berlin is likely to show progressive deterioration. Any substantial decline in orders for West Berlin firms would result in an increase in unemployment and a weakening of the West Berlin economy.

(Concurred in by [REDACTED])